square off against each other. Sepúlveda appeared to defend his work on the first day, while Las Casas arrived the following day with a comprehensive text in rebuttal. After much discussion the assembly adjourned until January 20 of 1551. After much negotiation they finally met in May of 1551, but no official finding was ever issued. The practical upshot was that Sepulveda did not secure permission to publish.
20
The dialogue itself opens with Démocrates and Leopold, his German protagonist from the earlier dialogue, taking their ease in the gardens by the banks of the Pisguera, in northern Spain. While spending "a few days with some friends at the Palace of Prince Philip," remarks Leopold, Fernán Cortés, Marqués del Valle, passed through," 21 and Leopold and his friends fell into conversation about the justice of Spanish behavior in the Indies. Démocrates, not a little put out by Leopold's obtuseness, embarks on an account of the natural law and justice in war. The first principle of the natural law, he explains, is "the rejection of evil and the choice of the good, from which no one can claim any excuse." 22 This natural law is written by God on the rational soul and philosophers agree that it "has the same force everywhere, whether acknowledged or not." 23 In the matter of war, justice requires not only cause, but authority and right intention, as well as rectitude in its execution.
24
While this would seem to follow the analysis of Thomas and Vitoria, the account begins to shift when Démocrates takes up the types of cause considered just for initiating war. The first, not surprisingly, is self defense, but in arguing this point Sepúlveda grounds it not in the just use of minimal force, in the manner of Aquinas, but rather in nature, which:
. . . armed the rest of the animals with claws, horns, teeth, hooves and other defenses, and prepared man for every sort of war by giving him hands, which substitute for claws, horns, and hooves, in as much as the hand can use a sword and lance and any other sort of weapon.
25
While Sepúlveda refers to Aristotle, 26 this passage bears a notable resemblance to Cicero's De Officiis, 1,4:
Nature has endowed every species of living creature with the instinct of self-preservation, of avoiding what seems likely to cause injury to life or limb, and of procuring and providing everything needful for life. 27 Cicero goes on immediately to remark that man:
is endowed with reason, by which he comprehends the chain of consequences, perceives the cause of things, understands the relation of cause to effect and of effect to cause, draws analogies, and connects and associates the present and the future-easily surveys the course of his whole life and makes the necessary preparations for its conduct. 28 The importance of establishing the Ciceronian background here is crucial. There are multiple accounts of "natural law" at work in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. That Sepúlveda cites Aristotle and Aquinas does not necessarily imply that his view of natural law is theirs, or that his arguments bear any strong semblance to theirs. This will prove particularly important when looking at the justice of conquest. The status of Cicero had been a rallying point for the earliest humanists. His language and arguments had become the mother's milk of humanist education. The demand for a "Ciceronian" standard in Latin had erupted into an international controversy in the 1520s.
29 It is not surprising, then, that Cicero's distinctively Roman account of the just war informed humanist thought. Cicero, a few chapters after his contrast of men and beasts, insists that "the only excuse, therefore, for going to war is that we may live in peace unharmed," adding that "no war is just, unless it is entered upon after an official demand for satisfaction has been submitted or a warning has been given and a formal declaration made." 30 Furthermore, while Cicero's Republic was not available to the mid-sixteenth century, important passages were preserved in school authors such as Isidore, who records Cicero's remarks that "those wars are unjust which are undertaken without provocation. For only a war waged for revenge or defense can actually be just," and that "no war is considered just unless it has been proclaimed and declared, or unless reparation has first been demanded," 31 and Nonnius, who repeats Cicero's judgment that "our people by defending their allies have gained dominion over the whole world."
32
As late as April of 1546 Sepúlveda wrote to Sebastián León that "I will never repent having taken Cicero as a model, as well as Quintillian."
33 Early in Démocrates Secundus, Sepúlveda remarks that "Isidore denies that a war is just which has not been formally declared." 34 Démocrates continues that "a second justifying cause for war consists in the recovery of plundered goods," going on to note that Abraham's aid to Lot shows that "it is just to make war not only to recover our own property, but that of our friends as well and to repelí attacks made on them."
35 His third class of just cause is by way of punishment, so that the offenders, "in receiving the merited punishment, learn by example for the future and everyone else takes fear through their example."
36 Distinctive in this third class is that such punishment and deterrence, frequently undertaken by the Greeks and Romans, carries with it "the unanimous approbation of the nations, whose shared sentiments are considered the law of nature," which Sepúlveda almost immediately describes as the "ius gentium." 37 To Démocrates' appropriation of the right to punish, Leopold objects that vengeance "is exclusively the right of God," but Démocrates dismisses this objection and reasserts that these three are the justifying causes listed by Isidore and recorded in Ecclesiastical decree. The Ciceronian background is clear to see. But at this point Sepúlveda makes a radical move, invoking Aristotle on natural slavery and connecting it explicitly to the affair of the Indies. Démocrates, considering the less common justifications for war, insists that they: nonetheless, are held to be thoroughly just and based in natural and divine law. One of these, the most applicable to those barbarians vulgarly called Indians, whose defense you seem to have taken up, is as follows: That those whose natural condition is such that they must obey others, if they refuse that lordship and there is no other recourse, may be subdued by arms; and that this war is just according to the opinion of the most eminent philosophers.
38
In the face of Leopold's exclamation that this is an outlandish doctrine, well removed from common opinion, Démocrates insists that it is only alien to those with a shadowy grasp of philosophy; it is, rather, "an ancient doctrine among the philosophers and thoroughly consistent with the natural law." Sepulveda's justification for these claims is his work on Aristotle's Politics, of which he published a translation in 1546. 39 This is only fitting, since their masters will make it possible for the defective to abide by the natural law and develop a lifestyle that is more humane and virtuous. And this, finally, is why:
rule must always rest in the power of the better and more prudent, since, as the philosophers teach, rulers who are true rulers are always guided by the better and more prudent governance, sensitive at every moment to the good of the community.
46
Consequently, it would be a dereliction of duty, once their true state has been discovered, for the Spanish, as emissaries of a more developed humanity, to leave the native Americans to their own devices. By the time Sepúlveda wrote, the impact of the conquests on the native peoples was a matter of public knowledge. Thus Leopold objects that "in this war against the barbarians there is considerable devastation and loss of life," and he goes on to worry that "this war against the barbarians, according to what I have heard, is not carried out with right intention, since they enter into them with no other goal than acquiring great amounts of gold and silver, by licit and illicit methods." 47 Démocrates responds in two steps. First, as St. Augustine argues, the real evil of war is not death, since everybody must die. And while it is true that greed and the desire for gain are among the real evils of war, "if wicked and unjust men commit crimes and acts of avarice and cruelty, as I have heard has happened on many occasions, this does not invalidate the cause defended by the prince and other honorable persons." 48 There is a distinction to be made, in other words, between the legitimate ius ad bellum provided by the barbarity of the Indians, and the failures of ius in bello perpetrated by the conquistadors as the instruments of the legitimate authorities. The evil done is perpetrated by the conquistadors as private citizens and, while regrettable, not relevant to the just claim provided by the natural slavery of the Indians.
There are two distinct questions to be asked of this argument. First, is it, as Sepúlveda claims, an argument sustained by philosophers generally and Aristotle in particular? Second, is it a credible argument independent of its sources?
As to its Aristotelian credentials, the argument is defective at two key points. There is first the interpretation of Aristotle on the "natural slave." Slavery that results solely from war or the strength of the master seems, according to Aristotle, to be a matter of law, "for the law is a sort of agreement under which things conquered in war are said to belong to their conquerors." Nonetheless, he goes on, "many jurists ... say that it is monstrous if the person powerful enough to use force, and superior in power, is to have the victim of his force as his slave and subject; and even among the learned some hold this view, though others hold the other." 49 Those who accept the justice of enslaving prisoners of war typically contradict themselves, for "there is the possibility that wars may be unjust in their origin and one would by no means admit that a man that does not deserve slavery can really be a slave."
50
What distinguishes the slave by nature is intellectual capacity; the slave by nature "participates in reason so far as to apprehend it but not to possess it; for the animals other than man are subservient not to reason, by apprehending it, but to feelings." 51 Given the limited ability of the slave to implement a rational plan of practical life, it is beneficial to him and to the master that he be deployed in a useful manner, which, in the nature of things, "diverges but little from that of animals. the rule over provincials is just, precisely because servitude is the interest of such men, and is established for their welfare when rightly established; that is, when licence to do wrong is taken away from wicked men; and that those subdued will be better off, because when not subdued they were worse off.
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There is much that can be said, and has been said, about this argument. One thing that assuredly must be said is that it is not by any stretch of the imagination an "Aristotelian" argument. This can be demonstrated by contrasting it with the Aristotelian account. Suppose, for example, we encounter a community that has adopted, as its way of life, "brigandage. If they direct their attentions toward us we would be entitled to repel them. And if we found it necessary we could suppress them. But once they had given up brigandage there would be no justice in confiscating their legitimately acquired goods. Nor, if we follow Aristotle's argument, would there be any moral justification for subjecting them to our rule, even though they might, in some sense, be "better off."
It is not open to Sepúlveda to follow the Aristotelian line of argument, however, if he wants to retain his conclusion. He needs to identify the Ciceronian position with that of philosophy generally and discount the thrust of Aristotle's text if he is going to move from "natural slavery" to the natural empire of the best. In a passage almost certainly directed against his Dominican protagonists, Sepúlveda writes: it is possible to arbitrate between levels of probability. Cicero believes that there is a strategy-a distinctive ratio argumentandi of Academic scepticism-for determining which of two or more alternative beliefs is the more probable (closer to, though always distinct from truth). The Academic will then choose to act in ways consistent with the 'more probable' alternative. The Academic method of rational exploration of alternatives enables him to make a positive decision about action ... the Pyrrhonist leads him uncritically to conform to whatever is politically and socially expedient (it simply makes no difference.) 78 These passages are worth having before us for the way they capture the shape of Sepúlveda's argument. What seems to be a straightforward natural law argument fails, by his lights, to acknowledge the difference of cultural and individual achievement between the Spanish and the New World natives. This is a difference that remains real, for Sepúlveda, even in those populations that are not involved in extensive human sacrifice. Thus there must be a more complex relationship to be established. While scepticism of the Pyrrhonian sort might paralyze political action, or lead, as in the case of Montaigne himself, to feeling a duty to submit to the demands of the state, 79 the Ciceronian is directed to look at alternative arguments, even and especially those that do not fit the simple syllogistic model. This, of course, is precisely what Sepúlveda does when he turns to Cicero's argument for the rule of the superior. 'Because he is aware of uncertainty (as in general philosophers are not)," writes Jardine, "the orator is closer to wisdom than the philosopher, according to Valla: more 'sophos' than the 'philosophos.'" 80 The case is not made less, but more credible, by the dialectical way in which Aristotle introduces the notion of the natural slave. There is no sure-fire way of determining who is a natural slave, though the point made by the Philosopher receives a certain intrinsic probability. Nonetheless, that neither the major nor minor premise of the practical syllogism-A) Natural slaves should be ruled by superior peoples;
B) The New World Indians are natural slaves; C) Therefore the New World Indians should be ruled by superior people-is certain does not mean that the conclusion does not hold. If there are natural slaves, they probably look more like the Indians than even our own peasants, pace Vitoria. Given that the argument can be argued to either conclusion (in utramque partem), the sound academic strategy is to assemble the collected authorities which can shore up the basic conclusion. When this conclusion is not necessary, its argument class is the epicheireme, an "argument in which the link between starting point and conclusion is not In one sense, at least, the imperial apologetics of Sepúlveda did not prevail. His petition to publish was rejected and the Démocrates Secundus languished unpublished for over three hundred years. But this limited and local victory should not be overestimated, for the tradition of Vitoria and Soto, despite its luminary status in 16th century Spain, would soon be superceded. The analysis of political justice and international conflict will, in the next century, systematically sever its connections to the Aristotelian tradition, to be replaced by a legal paradigm that will ultimately be associated with the Dutch polymath Hugo Grotius.
The argument between humanists and scholastics, illustrated in microcosm by Soto and Sepúlveda, illustrates several frequently unnoticed aspects of humanist influenced ethics in early modern Europe. First, there is the persistent myth of the Renaissance as a watershed era, marking a shift from the parochialism of the medieval period to a more cosmopolitan vision. We continue to be reminded of the fate of Galileo and the even sorrier one of Bruno. But the much remarked dignity of man asserted by so many humanists is restricted to men of a very special sort, namely those lucky enough to inherit the classical tradition of European antiquity. Other peoples, even when they are capable of building cities that rival the budding metropolises of Europe, have only such dignity as can be imparted to them by conquering benefactors. It is a commonplace of classical antiquity that justice is a matter of rendering to each his due, but it is the traditional Thomists of the second scholastic, hardly precursors of contemporary liberalism, who insisted that the canons of justice extended even to peoples of alien religion and less developed material culture. Soto, who stands at the beginning of the modern Catholic casuistical tradition, is much more committed to classical standards of political justice, informed by Aristotelian epieikeia, than the humanists and their heirs, from the "republicans" of the North Atlantic tradition to the pioneers of the North American west. And finally, though this last is only an earnest of work that needs to be done, we have good reason to believe that the erosion of the classical standards of argument represented by the humanism of Sepúlveda paves the way, intellectually at least, for the emergence of "reasons of state," "the right to conquest," and the "realism" of national interest under which political ethics continues to labor.
NOTES
Research for this essay was undertaken under the auspices of a summer seminar on religion and statecraft funded by the National Endowment for the Humanities and chaired by James Turner Johnson and John Kelsay at Rutgers in the summer of 1996. Many thanks to the Endowment and to Professors Johnson and Kelsay, as well as the members of the seminar generally, for much helpful discussion and support. I would 47 Ibid., 27-28. 48 55 1 am not wholly unsympathetic to the sensibilities of one reader, who suggests "mentally handicapped" as an alternative to "retarded." Nonetheless, the older "retarded" does a better job of capturing Soto's argument, for there are many ways of being handicapped. Vitoria himself had remarked on the ignorance and deplorable education of the native Americans, but had argued that it was, by itself, insufficient to justify conquest. To consider the retarded is to bring into the argument individuals who, for whatever reasons, are naturally unable to achieve what we take to be the intellectual independence of the ordinary peasant. If, as Soto will argue, this natural defect does not justify conquest, then the bar has been set at an even higher level. 56 
